INTRODUCTION
At the intersection of tort, property, and contract law sits a strange tort. 1 It began in 1853, in London, England, from a ferocious rivalry between two competing opera-house owners.
2 Johanna Wagner, a celebrated soprano star, had agreed to perform at Benjamin Lumley's opera house, but before she began her engagement, she accepted a better offer from Lumley's rival, Frederick Gye, to perform at his venue instead. Lumley pursued remedies in Part III examines how the gendered scenario underlying Lumley v. Gye influenced the way the court understood the case. The court focused on the relationship and rivalry between Lumley and Gye, and downplayed the role of Wagner in the triangular dispute. The male-centered approach allowed the court to break the doctrine of privity of contract and carve out a new source of tortious liability. Further, Wagner's status as a woman caught in the middle of this rivalry permitted the court to rely on previous legal fictions about causation, consent, and women, to ignore her role in causing the breach, and to treat her as though she were the property of the original promisee.
Part IV explores how the underlying gendered dispute in Lumley v. Gye created a tort that was facially neutral, but often deployed as an effective means of oppression over marginalized groups. The tort commodified the original promisor and her labor in a way that obscured her freedom of contract and facilitated her exploitation. Exploitation occurred in various contexts: the tort was used as a tool to restrict the mobility of recently freed slaves in the southern United States, as a means to squash attempts at labor union organization, and as a way to restrict employee mobility.
Part V offers a restructuring of the tort that neutralizes its gendered nature and resolves many of the problems associated with interference with contractual relations. Re-conceiving the tort as one in which both the promisor and the inducer play significant roles and are connected through a theory of joint liability ensures that the relationship between the contractual wrong and the tortious one is more compatible with private law principles. Also, the causation analysis of this version of the tort does not require a legal fiction to support it, and the breaching promisor is not treated as the property of the original promisee. This new view also advocates limiting the damages to those available under contract law principles in order to reflect a non-gendered understanding of the nature of the injury.
Ultimately, it is hoped that this Article reinforces the potential for feminist scholarship to enrich our general understanding of private law and clarify areas of doctrinal confusion. Focusing a feminist light on interference with contractual relations allows us to see how a tort that appears facially neutral is actually premised upon deep gender biases. Applying a feminist perspective also leads to re-envisioning the tort in a way that addresses these problems and offers a cohesive and coherent version of interference with contractual relations.
I. LUMLEY V. GYE

A. Factual Background: The Rivalry
Long before Benjamin Lumley and Frederick Gye arrived at the Court of Queen's Bench in 1853, the two men had been engaged in an intense, longstanding rivalry. Lumley's opera house, Her Majesty's Theatre, "had been 'practically the sole home of Italian opera'" until Gye's venue, Covent Garden, opened in 1847, and "in the succeeding years each opera house attempted to take over the other's business." 14 The rivalry was not limited to the business context, but was also deeply personal. In his diary, Gye tellingly wrote, "I have heard bad things of Lumley & now find him a devil incarnate-the most dreadful rascal with the smoothest face & manner I ever in the whole course of my life met . . . ." 15 The feeling was evidently mutual, as Gye also wrote that Lumley had vowed that "there would be war to the knife & he would crush me and Covent Garden too!!!" 16 Each man considered Johanna Wagner to be an important acquisition if they were to best the other, and they both desperately wanted to book the rising soprano star. As Gye described her in his diary:
Mdlle Wagner is a tall, handsome woman about 24, fair, with beautiful eyes hair and teeth & very graceful-her voice is of great compass, is clear powerful and good in all parts; she sings perfectly in tune and acts well but wants a little good Italian tuitionshe would hold an excellent position in London or Paris & bids fair to be one of the first singers in Europe. 17 Lumley echoed these sentiments in his memoirs, describing her as:
A magnificent voice, a broad and grand school of vocalization, and a marvellous [sic] dramatic power, joined to a comely person, were confidently asserted to form the almost unequalled attractions of this young lady, on whose co-operation the future fortunes of the establishment were now considered in a great measure to depend. 18 14 Waddams, supra note 2. 15 Id. at 432 (quoting Diary of Frederick Gye, entry for December 25, 1851). 16 Id. (quoting Diary of Frederick Gye, entry for February 18, 1852). Ten years after Lumley v. Gye, Lumley could not resist insulting Covent Garden in his memoirs about the opera. When lamenting the loss of recent operatic singing talents, Lumley accused Covent Garden of amplifying the orchestral sound so as to drown out the frailties of the talent: "The orchestra, having been augmented in proportion as vocal talent has waned, now constitutes the leading feature, especially at Covent Garden, where its masses of sound serve but to cover the deficiencies of artists whose voices it should assist and support." BENJAMIN LUMLEY, REMINISCENCES OF THE OPERA ix (1864). Interestingly, when Lumley writes of the case, he appears most focused on Johanna Wagner's perceived betrayal of him, referring to her trickery, etc. Id. at 331-32. This may be because a jury ultimately found Gye not liable, on the basis that Gye honestly believed that the contract between Lumley and Wagner was terminated, and Lumley did not want to dwell on the fact that his nemesis ultimately beat him in court. See Waddams, supra note 2 at 455-56. 17 Waddams, supra note 2, at 433-34 (quoting Travel Diary of Frederick Gye, entry for January 5, 1850).
18 LUMLEY, supra note 16, at 328. [Vol. 35 In pursuit of Wagner, Lumley and Gye engaged in vigorous wooing and "extraordinary efforts" to attract her to their venues. 19 Gye visited her in Berlin in 1851, and shortly thereafter a representative of Lumley visited her as well. 20 Lumley made her an offer, and negotiations began, which ultimately resulted in an agreement of engagement. 21 However, Lumley failed to make an advance payment when it became due, and Wagner, who now regretted the agreement with Lumley and had negotiated with Gye to earn more performing at his theatre, considered the contract to be in default. 22 She communicated to Lumley that she now considered their contract over, and refused to perform at his opera house. Lumley then turned to the courts for a remedy. He brought two suits: one seeking to enjoin Wagner from performing at Covent Garden (Lumley v. Wagner), and another seeking damages against Gye (Lumley v. Gye).
23
Because of the novelty of the claim Lumley asserted, Gye challenged him on demurrer and argued that there was no legally recognized claim.
24
Lumley argued that the old action of enticement, which prohibited a man from enticing away another's servant, was broad enough to encompass the kind of factual scenario before the court. 25 In a complex and often contradictory decision, and despite a powerful dissent by Lord Coleridge, a majority of the Court of Queen's Bench agreed with Lumley, and the new tort of interference with contractual relations was born.
26
B. Cultural Background: Erotic Triangles
Two men fighting over a woman, i.e. an erotic triangle, was not a new scenario in Victorian England, nor would it be today. 27 by Howard Jacobson. 28 Erotic triangles are embedded in our cultural narrative and form an important part of our lived experience. 29 In Victorian culture, the erotic triangle was a hugely popular and highly salient structure. Many books, plays, and operas appearing at that time featured erotic triangles, and the marital/adultery iteration of the triangle proved particularly fascinating to Victorian audiences. 30 In Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick used René Girard's study of nineteenth century literature to show how gender and power function in these structures. 31 The triangles are premised on the bond between the two rivaling men, and this male relation of rivalry constitutes a particular "calculus of power" from which the desired object is altogether excluded. 32 Although at first glance it may appear like erotic triangles arise because two men happen to desire the same woman, the second man actually desires the woman because of her connection to the rival; it is not her innate qualities, but rather her link to the other man, that makes her the rival's desired object. 33 The bond between the men is the triangle's most significant bond, an "intense and potent" connection that is "more heavily determinant of actions and choices, than anything in the one between either of the lovers and the beloved . These homosocial bonds play important roles in structuring the relationships between men, and in constructing masculine subjectivity. Recent masculinities studies have provided the insight that masculine identity is defined through a process of constant competition and rivalry, a "process of comparison, of measuring, that puts each man against all others."
36 Masculinity is performed for other men; male peers and male authority figures are the judges who determine whether the performance was successful. 37 A failed performance will likely result in feelings of humiliation, and it is the very fear of this humiliation that prompts much of the competition itself.
38
Even a successful performance offers little peace, for no sooner is masculinity proved once "that it is again questioned and must be proved againconstant, relentless, unachievable." 39 Choosing another man as a rival can come from a place of love, hate, or anything in between. 40 The rivalry can be a sort of euphemism for the desire to identify with or emulate the other, or it can be the classic, negative version of rivalry, in which one man seeks to defeat or best the other.
41
"[M]en often collaborate, cooperate and identify with one another in ways that display a shared unity and consolidate power between them," but their relationships "can also be characterized simultaneously by conflict, competition and self-differentiation in ways that highlight and intensify the differences and divisions between men." 42 They can use erotic triangles as a means of strengthening social ties, or as a way of challenging another's masculinity. Traditional marriage is perhaps the best example of an erotic triangle used to solidify a relationship: a father historically gave his daughter to another man as a way of aligning two families. Conversely, when one man challenged 35 Id. at 1-2. 36 another by attempting to take a woman from him, such actions historically led to violence and blood feuds between families. 43 In either scenario, though, women function as objects of exchange, rather than full persons. As the "locus of a more or less competitive exchange between two men," the woman is subordinated to a passive role; 44 the rivalry and relationship between the two men occurs "over" the woman, and she is the point beneath. Men retain their status as active subjects, while women are essentially transformed into commodities. Commodification, broadly speaking, is the "reduction of the person (subject) to a thing (object)." 45 Commodification has implications for the power structure of a society; "[o]ften, those whom commodification objectifies become entrenched as society's subordinated class. Conversely, those who control the terms of commodification secure their position as society's ruling class." 46 Law plays an important role in determining who is commodified and who does the commodifying. 47 
C. Legal Background
Erotic triangles have long been part of our legal narrative. Indeed, the understanding that relationships between men are often triangulated through women (and through certain other men occupying the lower ranks of the patriarchal hierarchy) was incorporated into ancient Roman law. 48 In that system, the paterfamilias, or head of the household, was entitled to bring an action for violence or insults inflicted upon his wife, children, or slaves. 49 It was understood that violence or insults to a person under the control of the paterfamilias was actually "only another form of insult to the paterfamilias himself." 50 In other words, one man would get at another through a third person, a member of the challenged man's household. By the mid-thirteenth century, English law had incorporated the idea that one man may strike at another through the body of a third person. 51 A lord could bring two types of actions against a person who harmed the members of his household: one for the loss of services he suffered when a dependent member of his household was injured, and the second for the insult to the lord himself. 52 In this second type of action, although the physical harm was inflicted on the body of another, the law interpreted that as an insult to the lord himself, an injury compensable to the lord regardless of whether or not the physical harm to his wife or servant resulted in an actual loss of services.
53
By the time William Blackstone wrote of the "three great relations" of English life in the mid-eighteenth century, each of these relationships was specifically protected against the kind of injury and insult described above. 54 The three great relationships, master-servant, father-child, and husband-wife, came with legal actions that compensated the challenged male when another man caused the loss of services of his servant, child, or wife. 55 These actions also included the legal recognition that the challenged man suffered a personal insult when a rival violently or insultingly interfered with the members of his household. The protections surrounding these three "great" relationships formed the legal precedents upon which the Lumley v. Gye decision was based.
Master-Male Rival-Servant: Enticement
In medieval times, the common law offered protection against three separate interferences in the master-servant relationship. 56 The three causes of action were as follows: first, per quod servitium amisit allowed a master to recover damages against a third party who beat his servant. 57 Second, a master could recover against a third party who wrongfully retained or harbored his servant. 58 Finally, a master could also recover if a third party enticed or procured away his servant. 59 In this context, men of subordinated status and women occupied the same role of mediating a relationship be- tween two men; both females and subordinated males served as the desired object in this context.
60
In the 1300s, after the Plague had decimated the population of workers, laws governing the master-servant relationship gained a new importance. In addition to the usual common law remedies, the Statute of Labourers of 1351 gave a legislative cause of action to masters, accompanied by severe penalties for disobedient servants. 61 In essence, the Statute "compelled involuntary servitude at pre-Plague wages and criminalized the enticing away of another's servants." 62 It provided a penalty of imprisonment for workers who left their employment, and for the new employers that hired them. 63 As was pointed out in Lumley v. Gye, the Statute was specifically targeted at a lower class of workers; it did not require everyone to work at pre-Plague wages, just those who labored in the traditional sense. 64 Those who held a higher status, like knights, esquires or gentlemen, were not subject to the ordinance. 65 The Statute forced only a lower class of servants to stay with their original employer or face imprisonment. The Statute effectively prevented this class of worker from having any mobility to transfer to a new employer or command a higher wage, and provided the master with a powerful tool to keep other men from competing with him for the services of his servant.
Father-Male Rival-Daughter: Seduction
Like the master-servant relation, the father-daughter relation was also protected against interference. By the nineteenth century, seduction, which allowed a father to bring suit against anyone who sexually interacted with his daughter without his consent, was a popular cause of action. 66 Seduction's underlying framework was heavily reliant on the law of master-servant relations. Indeed, at that time, the employment relation between a master and a female servant was similar to the familial relation between a father and daughter: a master/father stood in loco parentis to both. 67 Sexual interference with a female servant was treated as analogous to physical interference [Vol. 35 with a male servant, since, like a beating, sexual interference and a resulting pregnancy could disable the female servant and cause her to leave the service. 68 Seduction of a father's daughter fell within this same "loss of services" rubric, and initially focused on the loss of the daughter's contribution to the household income. 69 The cause of action later focused on the particular injury to the father: he suffered a loss of status corresponding to his daughter's perceived loss of virtue.
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Seduction was rooted in the idea that fathers owned their daughters, and were entitled to sole custodial rights. 71 Part of this ownership included a property right in a daughter's body and sexuality. 72 This property right rendered a daughter's consent or lack thereof to the sexual interaction a nonissue; she could not legally agree to engage in behavior that conflicted with the property right of her father.
73 Sexual access to her was his right to give. Courts sometimes justified the tort of seduction partly on the basis that it prevented the patriarchal violence and retribution that occurred when fathers took the law into their own hands. 74 Early common law sources show that nonmarital sex was understood as a battle between the men, and a heated one at that. 75 Seduction of young women could incite men to violent retaliation, and lead to enduring blood feuds. 76 As self-help retaliation moved to the "the more regularized public order of a lawsuit," the tort of seduction provided a legal substitute for that feud, and in lieu of blood vengeance, provided that fathers would receive damages. 
Husband-Male Rival-Wife: Criminal Conversation
While enticement offered compensation if one man "stole" another's servant, and seduction offered compensation if one man "stole" another's daughter, criminal conversation offered compensation if one man "stole" another's wife through sexual intercourse. 78 As with seduction, criminal conversation evolved from the master-servant rule. 79 In the early seventeenth century, when the master-servant rule expanded to apply to an interference with the husband-wife relationship, the injury was framed in terms of a loss 68 VanderVelde, Legal Ways of Seduction, supra note 43, at 821. 69 Id. at 821. 70 of services: loss of consortium allowed a cuckolded husband to bring an action against his wife's lover for damages on the basis that the lover had deprived him of his wife's services. 80 Later in the century, loss of consortium gave rise to a separate tort of criminal conversation, and criminal conversation dropped the requirement that the injury be framed in this way. The tort treated the adultery as a trespass and injury in itself. 81 The doctrine of coverture was an important founding principle for both loss of consortium and criminal conversation. Under coverture, the legal existence of the wife was subsumed upon marriage into that of her husband. Marriage essentially "confer[red] upon one of the parties to the contract, legal power & control over the person, property, and freedom of action of the other party, independent of her own wishes and will . . . ." 82 A wife lacked the benefits of full legal personality: she could not make contracts, own property, nor lay claim to the proceeds of her own labor.
83 Consistent with the framework of coverture, a wife's consent to the alleged adultery was legally irrelevant. Since she did not own the exclusive rights to her body, she could not be the one to exercise those rights. The only possible defense to criminal conversation, which was basically a strict liability tort, was the consent of the husband.
84
The criminal conversation action was initially only available to husbands, and wives had no corresponding ability to make a claim if their husbands were unfaithful. 85 Legally and culturally, the injury done to a wife when her husband was unfaithful was framed as mere hurt feelings. 86 Conversely, the husband's emotional injury, inflicted upon him by another man through the medium of his wife, was treated as a serious issue. 87 Even when framed as a property matter in the early form of the tort, the parties involved 80 LAURA HANFT KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL CONVERSATIONS: SENTIMENTALITY AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGAL STORIES OF ADULTERY 51-52 (1998). 81 Id. at 52. Even though criminal conversation did not require an allegation that there had been a loss of services, plaintiffs continued to allege that throughout the nineteenth century. 817-18 (1990) . 87 The law also recognized the magnitude of the injury by providing a defense for husbands who killed their wives' lovers.
Adultery in the nineteenth century was also a legitimate basis for husbands to kill seducers. Legally, this was explained as an extension of a man's right to selfdefense, not only of himself but also of his property as was the case with trespassers or burglars. The right was restricted, however, to killing a seducer "on the spot," thus justifying the killing as one that took place in the heat of passion rather than as a premeditated act that would be harmful to public peace.
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Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35 in loss of consortium and criminal conversation actions recognized that the true harm being recompensed was actually an injury to masculinity. 88 The harm was understood as a kind of emasculation or castration, "a figurative rape of man by man." 89 Trivial losses of service triggered large damage awards for cuckolded husbands, to compensate this sense of dishonor. 90 The criminal conversation cause of action did two important things: it commercialized the sexual dispute and removed women from the legal discourse. 91 The tort converted the sexual dispute from a type of perceived challenge to masculinity that would once have resulted in violence into a private, commercial one, between men. 92 The lawsuit became a contest in which husbands and lovers competed for patriarchal supremacy through a regulated economic fight in the courtroom, from which only one would emerge dominant. 93 Within this contest, the interests of women were irrelevant. As a "classically homosocial structure," the tort is between the two men; the wife's function in the case is as its contested object, her sexuality something that links the men and to which a money value is to be attached. Though her behavior is thus central to the litigative story, her "consent" to the adulteryher willingness, aggression, emotional involvement, in short, her subjectivity-is legally irrelevant, and therefore outside the story's narrative boundaries. 94 In the criminal conversation action (as in the enticement and seduction actions), the woman's role is subordinate: she acts as object to the male subjects. The legal story converts a sexual rivalry into "an economic relationship between two men, husband and lover" concerning "financially assessable damage to property." 95 In this story, the wife "fades from view." 96 The relationship of wife to lover and wife to husband is minimized or eliminated, and "the litigative conversation that ensues is entirely malevoiced. 
II. MALE EMPLOYER-MALE RIVAL-FEMALE EMPLOYEE: CONTRACTUAL INTERFERENCE
Prior to Lumley v. Gye, no court had held that procuring a breach of contract could constitute a tort. 98 The only procurement cases were the ones described above, involving servants, daughters or wives-"enticing away dependent members of another's household."
99 Why, then, did this particular case lead the court to expand tortious liability? 100 The answer, I suggest, must include a recognition of the particular gendered scenario that came before the court. As a woman, Johanna Wagner was more easily conflated with a dependent member of another's household, and the scenario therefore appeared more similar to those grounding the actions of enticement, seduction, or criminal conversation. Had Johanna Wagner been a man of equal social standing with Lumley and Gye, this association likely would not have manifested in the same way. In order for there to be a cause of action, the decision in Lumley v. Gye required one of two questions to be answered in the affirmative: either Johanna Wagner was a servant and thus naturally caught within the enticement action, or the enticement principle was broad enough to include her as a non-servant. 101 Her status as a woman caught between two competing men made the affirmative answers to both questions more likely. The factual matrix of Lumley v. Gye appeared as an erotic triangle, and the court therefore applied its cultural and legal knowledge of the regulation of erotic triangles to extend its principles to this new scenario.
As cognitive psychology has taught us, "culturally embedded stories or scripts," which are themselves usually inflected with gender, deeply affect our thoughts and decisions. 102 Stories about the way the world is, and the way people are, frame our beliefs and actions.
103 They influence our reasoning, including our legal reasoning. While cultural beliefs and norms inflect all areas of law, they are particularly potent in tort law. 104 Tort law, perhaps even more than other areas of law, is profoundly impacted by culture. 105 In many ways, tort law is less formalistic and more flexible than other legal fields.
106 Its "open-textured qualities allow great latitude for meaning mak- ing by all the actors in the tort law system and make tort law a particularly important site of the articulation and dissemination of cultural norms and images."
107
Because of its susceptibility to the importation of cultural beliefs and norms, tort law has an important role in gender ordering. If the culturally salient stories are ones of patriarchy and gender hierarchy, as erotic triangles are, tort law will reflect those values and can become "complicit in the control of women."
108 Each party to a tort action comes with a gender (and a race, sexual orientation, and economic or social class), and these characteristics come with their own stories.
109 These characteristics and their corresponding stories shape the way that the law is constructed and applied: the interpretations and understandings of legal claims, and the legal responses to harms, are often shaped by these factors. 110 Legal actors, including judges, draw upon cultural ideas and "deeply embedded notions" of gender that exist beyond the formal confines of the specific cases before them, 111 and these cultural understandings are then taken up and reified in the law.
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This effect is not limited to cases that are explicitly about women, as cases concerning domestic or family matters are sometimes viewed. Instead, "restricted conceptualizations of women influence jurists' interpretations of legal norms governing the economic sphere" and can inform the "jurist's sense of the scope or weight of a liberty interest" as well.
113
A. The Gendered Bonds
When the Lumley v. Gye tripartite male-male-female dispute came before the court, the court interpreted it in a way that conformed with the legal precedents that featured these gendered scenarios. The application of gendered triangulation had two important consequences for the three members of the Lumley v. Gye dispute: it influenced the creation of the malelaw, mirrors the economic, technological, ideological, and moral conditions that prevail in society at any given time . . . . The master ideas that drive tort doctrine-reasonableness, duty of care, and proximate cause-are as loose-jointed, context-sensitive, and openly relativistic as any principles to be found in law." PETER SCHUCK, TORT male tort bond, and it contributed to the court's understanding of the femalemale contract as establishing an unequal relationship status, rather than as establishing a regime of private ordering between two subjects.
The Male-Male Tort Bond
Before the court decided Lumley v. Gye, there was no legal link between a promisee to a contract and a third party who persuaded a promisor to breach that contract. 114 The doctrine of privity of contract dictated that the only parties that could be held liable in relation to the contract were the parties to it. Quite properly, then, Gye, in his defense, circumscribed the case as "a wrong between the plaintiff and Johanna Wagner alone," for which the proper cause of action was only in contract, not tort. 115 The court rejected this defense, and created a legal link between the two men. The judges gave a legal dimension to the social and competitive bond that already existed between Lumley and Gye, and bound them in tort. Building on the actions of enticement, seduction, and criminal conversation, where courts gave the man with the prior relationship to the woman property rights over her, the court found that what Frederick Gye did was essentially a wrongful act, committed against Benjamin Lumley.
116 In keeping with the tradition established in these prior causes of action, the court interpreted Gye's actions in relation to Lumley, and saw his persuasion of Wagner as an attempt to insult and injure Lumley.
The wrongful act that the new Lumley v. Gye tort targeted was a type of impermissible competition, one that constituted a potentially dangerous challenge to another man's masculinity. Typically, "[n]ineteenth century courts defined competition as a privilege to struggle against other persons who sought the same product within the same market; to compete was to fight with equals for the same end."
117 This idea echoes some of the honor traditions seen in dueling; men generally would duel only with others of similar social status.
118 However, as is clear from the torts of seduction and criminal conversation, once a man had acquired property rights to a woman, other 114 men were prohibited from competing with him, and any exchange had to be voluntary. By the time of Lumley v. Gye, the marketplace had emerged as an important locus of masculine competition. "Marketplace Masculinity," a way of relating marked by "aggression, competition, [and] anxiety-and the arena in which those characteristics are deployed-the public sphere, the marketplace," had become increasingly important since the 1830s.
119 Competition and interaction with other men in the context of the marketplace became a major source of masculine identity, and the marketplace became the most significant area for testing and proving manhood.
120
The allegation that Gye somehow "took" Wagner from Lumley thus could easily have been read by the court as an allegation that Gye had behaved in a way that transgressed the normal bounds of competition and threatened another man's masculinity, just as criminal conversation or seduction would have done. 121 The court used the concept of malice as shorthand for this. Malice was an important issue circulating in the case, one that led subsequent courts to assume that it was in fact the gist of the action.
122 According to the custom of the time, malice meant actual malevolence.
123 Although malice was used "loosely" and with an "evident contrariety of meanings," the concept was used as a justification for legally binding the two men together. 124 The court used malice to indicate that where one man targeted another and intended to insult him by, in some sense, "taking" a woman from him, such an act could be legally wrongful.
The Male-Female Contract Bond
With regard to the male-male bond, the court took a relational bond and made it more powerful by giving it a legal dimension. It created a legal bond where none existed before, because it understood the wrong to be between the two men. 125 For the male-female contract bond, however, the court did the opposite. It took a contractual bond, and focused not on the legal significance of that bond, but on its relational significance. At least initially, Johanna Wagner was legally bound to Benjamin Lumley through their contract, and that contract should have been the sole basis for liability 119 Kimmel, supra note 37, at 83. 120 Id. at 82. 121 In discussing the principle behind this case, Justice Erle states that "the right of action in the master arises from the wrongful act of the defendant in procuring that the person hired should break his contract, by putting an end to the relation of employer and employed . . . ." Lumley v. Gye, (1853) for any issues with her performance. However, because the law typically configured legal actions involving women as triangulated between two men, the contractual bond, which should have established a binary between two subjects, was sublimated to the gendered structure of the erotic triangle and the higher power of the relational bonds that tie women to men. These bonds were based not in contract, but in status relations, and under these status relations, women were subordinate to a more powerful male. Since the bond between Lumley and Wagner was viewed as unequal because of the gender of the parties, the court more easily equated that unequal bond with another: that of master and servant.
In the mid-nineteenth century, when Lumley v. Gye occurred, the old status-based regime was evolving into a new contract-based one. 126 In the early nineteenth century, a status-based regime reigned. 127 This regime was based on ascription, under which social positions are determined by ascribed characteristics, like sex, race, or ethnicity.
128 A status-based society perpetuates a "natural order of subjection," in which the law uses status as an ordering principle. 129 The more modern contract regime, on the other hand, supposes that people are not born into specific social stations, but rather can, as free and rational beings, make agreements that can shift their social positions. 130 They can define their own roles, and choose to enter or not enter into legally significant relationships with others. 131 A contract regime purports to represent "a civil order of freedom," and political modernity.
132
Johanna Wagner had entered into a contract with Benjamin Lumley, an act that should have meant that they had agreed to a private ordering between them. As such, their private agreement should have governed the performance and breach of those obligations, subject to the applicable law. In a world of private contractual ordering, privity of contract should have limited the dispute to one between her and Lumley, and her breach should have rendered her solely liable for damages. Lumley v. Gye, however, represented a moment in which contract was unable to overcome status. Instead of being seen as a person with the freedom to make and break contracts, subject to the usual contractual liabilities, Johanna Wagner was viewed as a woman, whose very ability to enter those contracts was somewhat anomalous. The LumleyWagner-Gye erotic triangle was similar enough to the already established situations of enticement, seduction, and criminal conversation that Wagner and Lumley's relationship could more easily be analogized to that of servant and master. The court noted that "where a party has contracted to give his personal services for a certain time to another, the parties are in the relation of employer and employed, or master and servant, within the meaning of this rule." 133 Because the court classified Wagner as a servant, her contractual relations were adjudicated under a separate set of standards from those applicable to the usual male-male contractual relations between equals. Shifting the blame to Gye implied that Wagner lacked legal subjectivity and "the capacity to decide to breach," 134 despite the fact that she was technically able to enter into a contractual arrangement. 135 Indeed, only a small subsection of women at the time had the power to enter into legally binding contracts at all. Married women were subject to the law of coverture, under which they did not have the independent legal personhood required for contracting by themselves. 136 Only an unmarried woman like Johanna Wagner could contract on her own behalf, and thus even the fact that she could become a party to an employment contract was relatively rare.
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Instead of being viewed as people with all the accoutrements of legal personhood, in the nineteenth century, there was a "culturally constructed barrier to conceiving of women as autonomous parties."
138 Women were understood as relationally bound to men: their identities and spheres of acceptable behavior were determined through their relationship to a more powerful male. Servants were bound to their masters, daughters were bound to their fathers, and wives were bound to their husbands. In Lumley v. Gye, a female performer was understood to be similarly bound, but this time to her male employer. She was not seen as an independent actor in a marketplace, able to control her own labor and act for her own economic gain, but instead as subordinate to the man she contracted with.
139
In many contract cases involving female performers that occurred after Lumley v. Gye, the contractual/relational bond between female performers and their theatre-manager employers seemed to be conflated with a marriage 133 bond. 140 Theatre managers likely viewed their contractual relationships with their female employees not as merely commercial arrangements, but as marital ones. 141 Their confusion is not surprising given that the same word, "master," referred both to husbands and to employers. 142 The legal construction of the marital and employment relationships were closely related as well: they shared the same root, and "[s]tandard nineteenth-century legal treatises on domestic relations contained chapters on husband and wife next to chapters on master and servants." 143 The line between husband and employer was linguistically, culturally, and legally blurred, and female performers were seen as quasi-wives, subject to the will of their employers.
144
As a quasi-wife, a female performer's contractual breach was more easily linked with adultery and infidelity.
145 Both breaches are marked by disobedience and activeness: contract performance, regardless of whether it is found in the commercial or marital context, is passive and obedient, whereas breach or nonperformance is active and disobedient. 146 Disobedience was a subversion of woman's gender role and a threat to the power of the master or husband; "[w]omen were expected to be obedient and subordinate." 147 Moreover, disobedience suggested a betrayal and the infliction of psychic injury upon the master or husband, an injury that was worsened if the disobedience was the result of a connection to a rival male.
148
Through the close parallels between the Lumley-Gye-Wagner commercial triangle and the husband-rival-wife domestic triangle, elements of criminal conversation were able to seep into the construction of the tort. The common legal-cultural narrative of adultery colored the story of Johanna Wagner and the man to whom she was contractually bound. In fact, in Lumley v. Gye, one of the cases explicitly relied on to extend the application of the enticement action was Winsmore v. Greenbank, an action brought by a husband against a rival alleged to have disrupted his wife's services to him.
149 140 See id. at 831. 141 See id. VanderVelde notes that the negative injunction cases she studied did not have corresponding actions in interference with contractual relations. Id. at 844 n.368. This may be due to the fact that although Lumley was successful in the demurrer action, he ultimately lost the case at trial on the grounds that Gye genuinely believed that the Lumley-Wagner contract was terminated. These cultural overlays on this male-female contractual bond prevented it from holding the power that a male-male contractual bond would have had-because one of the parties was a woman, the relation was more easily conflated with the marital one, and thus the rules that applied to that type of relationship were thought to appropriately apply to this one as well. Because gender affected "the character of the relationship," what should have been a contract between equals was interpreted more like a master-servant relationship. 155 Moreover, the male-male tort bond was given prominence in the dispute, and seen as more significant than the contractual connection. This is the basis for the tension between contract and tort visible in interference with contractual relations, and the reason why the doctrine of privity of contract was broken.
B. Causation and the Female Intermediary
The gendered nature of the bonds in Lumley v. Gye connects to another enduring problem of interference with contractual relations: the problem of novus actus interveniens. Normally, a human intermediary standing be-tween a plaintiff and defendant will break the chain of causation, since the intermediary possesses free will and is responsible for making her own decisions. 156 However, causation, like most other legal concepts, is a matter of cultural habit. 157 Rather than having independent logical content, causation is a flexible concept, and "[c]ause and effect can be defined and connected in a wide variety of ways, and attributions of such linkages are shaped (collectively and individually) by where one wants blame to end up."
158 It acts as a glue that allows us to "stick a defendant to a plaintiff" according to where one feels that fault lies.
159
The precedents to Lumley v. Gye illustrate that our concept of causation is a malleable concept, one that is influenced by gender. Through actions in enticement, seduction, and criminal conversation, courts created the legal fiction that servants, children, and wives had no "free will independent of the master's." 160 Accordingly, causation was a non-issue in these cases: courts felt that the male rival was a wrongdoer, and they modeled the causation doctrine to comply with this belief.
In Lumley v. Gye, the majority of the court implicitly included this same idea. Johanna Wagner occupied a category-woman-that was closely adjacent to the categories of wife and servant, and so it was not difficult for the court to gloss over the problem of her intervening will. In fact, Judge Coleridge's dissent specifically pointed to the problematic nature of such a conflation. He noted that the law for causation in regard to wives was not applicable to the unmarried Johanna Wagner, and argued that while, in a criminal conversation action, "effectual persuasion to the wife to withdraw and conceal herself from her husband is in the eye of the law an actual withdrawing and concealing," this legal fiction should not have applied in the instance before the court. 161 The court's focus on the rivalry between Lumley and Gye allowed the issue of causation to fade into the background. For if one concentrates "solely on the pursuers and their rights and privileges against each other, one avoids the questions of causation and indemnity that result from viewing those rights and privileges as channeled through the obligor or potential obli- gor." 162 The problem, though, is that rights and privileges are channeled through the obligor, and by "ignoring the fact that the decision to breach or not breach lies in the hands of the breaching party, we treat the breacher as being without will." 163 Holding someone liable for someone else's decision implies that the latter is not an autonomous being. It is incompatible with the understanding of a person as a "human being in charge of his or her own life." 164 Today, we no longer accept legal fictions that deny the independent wills of servants and wives, yet no acceptable alternative rationale for this aspect of the tort has been offered. The intervening will issue remains an unsolved problem. Usually the issue is simply ignored; causation is rarely considered in its own right. Ultimately, one scholar advises, "a search for a well-defined causation analysis" for the tort will only end in frustration. 165 The oft-referenced Restatement (Second) of Torts gives only the briefest of guidance on this issue. 166 Case law typically provides a superficial application of the "but for" test and ignores issues which should be of great significance in determining liability, like the promisor's state of mind, and the evidentiary elements required to establish that state of mind.
167 Indeed, it is questionable whether the "but for" test is even an appropriate one.
168
When the courts do provide a truncated analysis of causation, they often rely on proximate cause to establish the causation link. 169 The "but for" test is cursorily used first to establish cause in fact, 170 and then to establish proximate cause, which "concerns whether the law should impose liability after the evidence establishes cause in fact."
171 Prosser offers his opinion on the role of proximate cause in the tort:
Some of the earlier decisions denying liability argued that the defendant's conduct can never be a proximate cause of the breach, since there is an intervening voluntary act of the third party promissor; but where that act is intentionally brought about by the defendant's inducement, or is even a part of the foreseeable risk 162 which he has created, it seems clear that the result is well within the limits of the "proximate." 172 This view, that proximate cause should entail that "a man might be held liable for any 'natural and probable' consequences of his actions even if there were human intermediaries," is problematic. 173 The legal gymnastics required to reconcile normal understandings of causation with the tort are best explained by simply realizing that the case continued the tradition of using the legal fiction that servants, daughters, and wives had no independent will that could break the chain of causation.
C. The Property Problem
In addition to the construction of causation, the legal predecessors to interference with contractual relations imported another problematic concept into the new tort-the way in which legal erotic triangles configured women as property. Proprietary interests underpinned the creation of interference with contractual relations.
174 Put bluntly, "[t]he tort grew out of a desire to protect the property interests people supposedly had in other people."
175
More specifically, it grew out of the desire to protect the property interests that men had in women. From a master's property interest in his female or male servant, and a father's property interest in his daughter, and a husband's property interest in his wife, came a man's property interest in a contractual relationship formed with a woman. In these predecessor torts, the property rationales were initially explicitly acknowledged, and so, too, in the case of interference with contractual relations. Gye's counsel "vigorously argued" 176 that, in order to succeed on the claim, Lumley "must have a property in the thing taken away," 177 and the judges endorsed this view. By the early 1900s, courts often expressed their understanding that the basis of the tort was in protecting a property right.
178
In 1853, giving a man a property right in a woman who was contractually bound to him was a relatively unremarkable proposition. 179 However, as cultural milieus changed and the idea that one person could hold property [Vol. 35 rights in another became abhorrent, a new rationale was needed to justify the tort of interference with contractual relations. Many of these new justifications were rooted in notions of property, but highlighted proprietary rights in contractual performance, rather than a contracting party. In modern cases, courts frequently express the idea that promisees have proprietary rights in the performance of contracts; however, they do not explain how, or why, the performance of the contract should have this quality.
180
The High Court of Australia deftly illustrates the circularity of the reasoning often employed:
[the theory that contractual rights are quasi-proprietary] seeks to answer the question: "Why is a plaintiff's right to performance of a contract protected against third party interference?" It gives the answer: "Because it is quasi-proprietary." But that raises the question: "Why is it quasi-proprietary?" The answer is: "Because it is protected against third party interference."
181
Many scholars have posed justifications for the tort that are rooted in property, but no argument has convincingly articulated why a contractual right that is normally only effective against other parties should suddenly become a property right against anyone who induces another to breach.
182
In their defense, that is no easy task. Property conceptions are not the finest of analytical tools:
Once it is recognized that property is a social construct rather than a transcendental phenomenon, it must become apparent that the concept is limited both in its content as well as analytic value. Ultimately, the decision to confer proprietary protection on a particular resource or interest calls for a thorough and explicit examination of the nature of the interest as well as the relevant policy considerations. By itself, property talk is neither a sufficient nor a useful substitute.
183
Recognizing the bias built into the tort of interfering with contractual relations reveals why it cannot be explained in a way that reconciles current conceptions of property with the autonomy of all the individuals involved.
already hired his former slaves on as employee/servants. 200 When a neighbor persuaded the former slaves to work for him instead, the plantation owner successfully brought an action against his neighbor. 201 In some states, enticement laws took the tort action one step further and criminalized the hiring of a worker who was already under contract. 202 Even the former slaves who chose to stay on the same plantation under the new regime of sharecropping were restricted by the tort. Egalitarian and cooperative sounding, the sharecropping system allowed former slaves to perform agricultural labor on the same land they once did, though this time they were compensated with some of the crop. 203 Theoretically, they also should have been free to move between lands, to seek out better returns for their labor. Soon, however, the potential of Lumley v. Gye to keep these workers in their place, both literally and figuratively, became apparent. Southern states quickly took advantage of the doctrine by classifying the former slave sharecroppers into the same category as contract service providers. 204 Once so defined, the Lumley v. Gye tort ensured that at-will contracts could effectively stifle the mobility of these workers. 205 Other landowners would face tortious liability if they encouraged workers to leave their former master's employ, leaving the former slaves with few options. Essentially, the contract and tort combination became "a means of perpetuating slavery under a different name." [Vol. 35 market is, for most individuals in American society, the most significant resource that they own and control," and the tort fundamentally impacted that ability. 209 As was stated by Lord Lindley in Quinn v. Leathem, "a person's liberty or right to deal with others is nugatory, unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with him affects him."
210 By deterring alternative employers, the tort decreased the possibility of more lucrative alternative employment for former slaves.
211 Also by decreasing the potential for alternative employment, the tort impacted the right to quit.
212 "The right to quit is the antithesis of slavery. Being able to quit is the minimal means of guarding against unduly oppressive labor conditions and is fundamental to controlling one's person and one's labor."
213 When the possibilities of alternative employment are taken away, there is little freedom to quit, and little opportunity to raise one's economic lot.
B. Suppression of Labor Movements
Former slaves were not the only workers who were subjected to the tort's coercive effects.
214 "The German sociological tradition has long taught us to see in the legal protection of property rights a source of coercive power over the working classes," and this form of protection of property rights was no exception. 215 Marx, in particular, raised questions of power and equality in connection with contract, and suggested that "power struggles between cropper and his family from "their houses, and to take to himself the whole of their labor and crop." 70 N.C. at 616-17 (Reade, J., dissenting). And, as the dissent pointed out, even a slave had a right to be fed and clothed, whereas the cropper was responsible for meeting his own material needs. Id. at 618. 209 VanderVelde, Gendered Origins, supra note 3, at 783 n.34. 210 Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495 (H.L.) 534 (appeal taken from Ir.) (Lindley, L.J.).
211 Law and economic scholars also provide a theoretical basis for understanding how incentives and deterrents work in the tort. Harvey Perlman explains that the tort deters the breach of contracts to the extent that a third person may be less likely to make a better offer to a promisor, since the possibility of tort damages being imposed upon him will mitigate his potential gain from the agreement. Perlman, supra note 8, at 83-84. The possibility of punitive damages, too, will weigh heavily against the production of a better offer. BeVier, supra note 182, at 917. 212 VanderVelde, Gendered Origins, supra note 3, at 794. 213 Id. 214 In the United Kingdom, strikes feature in about 40 per cent of all the reported cases in which Lumley has provided the basis of a cause of action. Another 20 per cent of the reported cases concern other issues arising out of employment or personal services contracts. Typically they concern employers who lure away employees who have special skills or confidential information. capitalists, the bourgeoisie, and workers resulted in more freedom for some contracting parties than others." 216 The tort initially ensured that the contracting employers retained more freedom than the contracting employees: it was used as a tool against many members of the working class to "enforce compulsory labor" and suppress labor unions. 217 The tort's role in suppressing organized labor is significant, and was "[o]ne of the factors that propelled the development of the interference tort . . . ." 218 Employers often used interference with contractual relations to thwart union organization. 219 Union organizers, on the other hand, were usually unable to successfully rely on the action: "[w]hile combinations of businessmen that destroyed the livelihood of nonmembers were tolerated, unions that inflicted similar harm as a means to increase bargaining power rather than as an end were found to have engaged in intimidation and duress." 220 So-called yellow-dog contracts, were also closely connected to this cause of action. These contracts, in which an employer provided employment on the basis that the employee agreed not to join a union, were called yellow-dog contracts in order to express "connotations of animal servitude as opposed to human dignity." 221 In Hitchman Coal and Coke v. Mitchell, a 1917 decision of the United States Supreme Court, the Court upheld an injunction prohibiting a union from interfering with the yellow-dog contracts at two coal mines. 222 This precedent encouraged other employers to avoid unions by entering into similar contractual arrangements with their employees. [Vol. 35 inherently suspect about a tort that, at bottom, concerns an employee's voluntary departure from employment." 225 While this case was eventually overruled by the California Supreme Court, the Appellate Court's initial declaration of a public policy against such a claim demonstrates some of the discomfort surrounding the tort. By imposing damages on the next employer to hire a departing employee, the "practical effect of this tort is to decrease the value to prospective employers of an employee under contract, rendering the employee more likely to remain with her current employer." 226 Further, the tort stifles an employee's ability to voice dissatisfaction and raise grievances, since there are fewer "substitute employment opportunities" as a result of the tort's deterrent properties. 
IV. RESTRUCTURING THE TRIANGLE
The old torts of enticement, seduction, and criminal conversation were explicitly based on the idea that men had property rights to their servants, daughters, and wives. When it became culturally unacceptable to speak of one person holding property rights in another, however, the arguments regarding the rationales for these torts shifted. Legal figures turned to other justifications for the torts of seduction, criminal conversation, and the similar American tort, alienation of affections. 232 For instance, by the early twentieth century, courts no longer explained the tort of seduction using a property rationale. Instead, they cited the "'moral and emotional investment in sexual chastity . . . as a legally protected interest' compensable with hard 225 Id. at 667. 226 currency." 233 Criminal conversation underwent a similar conversion, and the rationale espoused morphed into "the protection of the marriage relationship and the larger marital institution from outsiders . . . ." 234 Alienation of affections, an American tort that allows a jilted spouse to sue someone alleged to have caused the loss of affection, also lost its property rationale in favor of a justification based on the plaintiff's interest in marital exclusivity and consortium, rather than the plaintiff's property interest in his spouse. 235 Once the property rationales were abandoned, though, few of the new rationales were compelling enough to justify the continuations of these torts, and they have disappeared from most jurisdictions. 236 Because these legal erotic triangles were based upon regulating the exchange of women as the property of men, the torts simply could not overcome their deeply offensive genesis. As one scholar phrased it, "to retain a tort that originated from a husband's exclusive right to his wife's sexuality arguably promotes disrespect for the law." 237 Through its gendered beginning, interference with contractual relations participated in this legacy of regulating homosocial relationships between men in a way that ensured women and other members of subordinated status would remain in that subordinated status. The particular status of Johanna Wagner as an unmarried woman was viewed through a cultural lens as enough like a wife or servant to be easily associated with the legal structures that applied to them. Once she had served as the first step down the path of expansion, the door was open to apply the tort to other people, including men in traditionally subordinated groups. Now, of course, the tort is available to all. But its offensive past as a highly effective tool of oppression gives us reason to ask, "[have] the old malevolent purposes . . . been replaced with modern rectitude . . . [o]r, does some of the evil remain, albeit more disguised?" 238 Even without considering how gender has structured interference with contractual relations, many scholars have suggested that the problems inherent in it warrant at least a major renovation. 239 When these arguments are combined with an understanding of its gendered genesis and subsequent development as a tool of subordination, there is a compelling basis to argue that this tort should travel the same path as torts like criminal conversation. tort. 244 In the case of interference with contractual relations, the participation is not in another's tort. Instead, the underlying wrong is a breach of contract. Technically, then, an inducer and a promisor cannot be joint tortfeasors, because "breach of contract is not a tort," and therefore the promisor is not a tortfeasor at all. 245 Further, joint liability usually results in shared liability for the same tort, not liability for a separate tort of inducing or procuring.
If the underlying wrong is a breach of contract, how can the inducer, who is not a party to the contract nor under any duty of performance in regards to it, nevertheless be liable for breach? Liability attaches because the inducer's intentional and knowing participation in the breach makes it appropriate for the inducer to share in the responsibility for it as a type of mixed joint liability. Importantly, a rights-based view of the tort supports the imposition of liability in this way: "[t]he induced contracting party has violated a right of the plaintiff and the defendant comes to be responsible for that violation since he or she has participated in a meaningful way in the violation by procuring it." 246 Adopting this new conception of the tort requires only a relatively small doctrinal shift. The tort's elements would be the same as those already required by the restrictive view of the tort applied in many jurisdictions. Generally, there must be an enforceable contract, the promisor must breach that contract, the interferor must have knowingly induced or participated in that breach, and the promisee must have suffered damage as a result. 247 The first element limits this tort to breaches of enforceable contracts. This is because unless a right of the plaintiff has been violated, it does not make sense to speak of the defendant's participation in that violation. Many jurisdictions, including New York, Maryland, Idaho, and Georgia already contain such a requirement. 248 Also, there must be an actual breach of that contract, not a mere disruption. 249 This will limit the scope of the tort and achieve the goal of restricted applicability that many scholars have sug-LLC v. Pfeil, the court referred to the defendant's argument that one of the alleged breaching promisors should have been included in the action as essentially an argument that "all joint tortfeasors must be named in the action," 256 and in Skelly v. Richman, too, the court noted that the promisor and the inducer were "somewhat in the status of joint tortfeasors." 257 Also, a Georgia statute makes a party who has maliciously procured a breach of contract jointly liable for the breach. 258 This new view of the tort clarifies what the interferor must do to attract liability, simplifies the relationship between contract and tort principles, avoids the causation problem associated with the current conception of the tort, and does not treat the promisor as the property of the promisee. It acknowledges the promisor's role in the breach by treating both the promisor and the interferor as liable together. Rather than replicating a triangular structure, this vision of the tort would create a two-party structure, with both the inducer and the promisor as autonomous actors. Each party is responsible for her own actions and held to account for her own decisions.
The new view also avoids the significant difficulties associated with viewing the tort as rooted in property. Whereas a conception of the tort as involving property rights "places burdens on strangers" to respect other people's contracts, the joint liability view simply says that liability will attach to active participation in the breaches of others. 259 The participation in the breach is more consistent with the "basic private law principle that the only person on whom liability is to be foisted is the person who it can be said has infringed the plaintiff's right," 260 since the promisor and the interferor have together infringed the plaintiff's right.
This view also accords well with the treatment of breaches in contract law. " [T] he law attaches no stigma or special sanction to a contracting party who for economic reasons chooses to breach. If breaching a contract is not itself blameworthy, then '[t]o hold an inducer liable, his behavior must be at least as culpable as that of the breaching promisor; to impose a liability rule more onerous than that imposed on the promisor, the inducer must be more culpable.'" 261 This form of joint liability holds an inducer liable to the same extent the breaching party is held liable, because the inducer has participated in the breach in a way which makes him as culpable as the breaching party. 
B. Damages in Contract
Gender issues heavily influence how injuries are understood and valued. The gender of the plaintiff, in particular, impacts how the law will conceptualize the harm. 262 As we saw in Lumley v. Gye, the idea that interference with contractual relations should attract tort damages grew out of the court's understanding of the injury as more than just a mere breach of contract. The injury was arguably understood as a psychic injury to masculine identity similar to the kind of injury a cuckolded husband or father of a seduced daughter might experience. Just as the damage awards for the cuckolded husband and the father of a seduced daughter may have been very high to compensate for the perceived severity of the emotional and moral injury inflicted upon the plaintiff by another man, the suggestion in Lumley v. Gye was that this similar injury could attract a similarly high damage award. 263 Since Justice Erle's bare pronouncement in Lumley v. Gye that contractual remedies may be inadequate and that the inducer "might justly be made responsible beyond the liability of the contractor," 264 the question of the appropriate measure of damages for interference with contractual relations has received little attention. 265 Courts typically analogize the situation to those of other intentional torts, and reason that like those torts, a plaintiff's damages should not be restricted. 266 Interference with contractual relations can result in the usual spectrum of tort damages: damage awards can compensate emotional and reputational harms to the plaintiff, the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the bargain, and the consequential losses legally caused by the interference. 267 Damages for loss of profits are frequently awarded. 268 Also, because the damages are in tort, punitive damages are possible.
In contrast, the promisor's liability is limited to the damages regularly available under contract law. This is because the cause of action against the promisor is framed as a contractual, rather than tortious harm. The action in contract against the promisor does not limit a plaintiff's ability to bring an action for tortious interference, but any actual payments made by the promisor in settlement of the contractual claim must be deducted from any tort award against the interferor. 269 Since the damages for breach are common to
